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Abstract—In pervasive computing environments, Location- 
Based Services (LBSs) are becoming increasingly important 
due to continuous advances in mobile networks and positioning 
technologies. Nevertheless, the wide deployment of LBSs can 
jeopardize the location privacy of mobile users. Consequently, 
providing safeguards for location privacy of mobile users 
against being attacked is an important research issue. In this 
paper a new scheme for safeguarding location privacy is 
proposed.  Our approach supports location K-anonymity for a 
wide range of mobile users with their own desired anonymity 
levels by clustering. The whole area of all users is divided into 
clusters recursively in order to get the Minimum Bounding 
Rectangle (MBR). The exact location information of a user is 
replaced by his MBR. Privacy analysis shows that our 
approach can achieve high resilience to location privacy 
threats and provide more privacy than users expect. 
Complexity analysis shows clusters can be adjusted in real time 
as mobile users join or leave. Moreover, the clustering 
algorithms possess strong robustness. 
Keywords—k-anonymity; clustering; location privacy; 
location-based services; pervasive computing 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The proliferation of smart gadgets, applications, mobile 
devices, PDA and sensors has enabled the construction of 
pervasive computing environments, transforming regular 
physical spaces into “Active Information Spaces” augmented 
with intelligence and enhanced with services [1-3]. Location-
Based Services (LBSs) are one of the most desirable classes 
of services to be offered in pervasive computing 
environments. Service providers envision offering many new 
services based on a user’s location as well as augmenting 
many existing services with location information [4]. 
Considering this scenario, someone wants to have dinner and 
is searching for a restaurant using the Internet. In order to get 
more accurate and useful research results, more terms such 
as the mobile user’s location, the type of food, etc. should be 
included in his search criteria. Unfortunately, if the queries 
are not securely managed, it could be possible for a third 
party to retrieve the mobile user’s personal sensitive 
information such as his location information, his habit, etc. 
In this case, even if an individual does not directly release 
personal information to the service provider, this provider 
may become aware of the sensitive information if it has to 
provide a service to such an individual.  
Privacy in pervasive computing environment includes 
anonymity, context, confidentiality and integrity [5]. Except 
users who want to disclose their context information (e.g., 
location, duration, name of service, etc.), no one including 
outsiders and service providers should know about such 
information. Location Privacy is a particular type of context 
privacy. It is defined as the ability to prevent other 
unauthorized parties from learning one's current or past 
location. In LBSs, there are two types of location privacy [6]: 
personal subscriber level privacy and corporate enterprise-
level privacy. Personal subscriber-level privacy must supply 
rights and options to individuals to control when, why, and 
how their location is used by an application, and to prevent 
other parties from learning one’s past or current location. 
Location privacy threats refer to the risks that an 
adversary can obtain the mobile user’s location data. 
Furthermore, if the LBS provider is unreliable, the location 
information may be abused and the users may face undesired 
advertisements, e-coupons, etc. Motivated by this fact, a new 
method of protecting location privacy based on clustering is 
developed in this paper. Specially, we prevent an attacker 
from inferring the real location information of the mobile 
user by adapting the K-anonymity technique to the spatial 
domain. 
The concept of K-anonymity was introduced as 
characterizing the degree of data protection with respect to 
inference by linking [7]. K-anonymity can be ensured in 
information release by generalizing and/or suppressing part 
of the data to be disclosed. A data release is said to meet K-
anonymity if every topple released cannot be related to fewer 
than K respondents, where K is a positive integer set by the 
data holder. In order to protect the location information of 
mobile users in the context of LBSs, Gruteser and Grunwald 
[8] firstly employed K-anonymity. A subject is considered as 
K-anonymity with respect to location information, if and 
only if the location information sent from one mobile user is 
indistinguishable from the location information of at least K-
1 other mobile users. The spatio-temporal cloaking [8] 
assumes that all users have the same K-anonymity 
requirements and K cannot vary with the different privacy 
requirements of different users. In order to increase the 
scalability, a customizable K-anonymity model instead of a 
uniform K was proposed in [9]. Every user can specify a 
different K-anonymity value based on his minimum 
anonymity level and his preferred spatial and temporal 
tolerance level in order to maintain the personalized variable 
privacy requirements. This model can avoid the drawback of 
a large K-anonymity spatial region, which is an area that 
encloses the mobile user querying to a LBS server. However, 
due to the computation overhead of the clique graph, this 
approach is only able to meet the small K-anonymity 
requirements of mobile users. 
In order to solve the above drawbacks [9], Casper [10] is 
proposed. Casper includes a location anonymizer and a 
privacy-aware query processor. The location anonymizer 
implements the location K-anonymity based on the specified 
privacy requirements. The privacy-aware query processor 
deals with the cloaked spatial areas rather than the exact 
location information. Though Casper can achieve high 
quality LBSs, it cannot meet the QoS requirements of mobile 
users. Therefore an efficient message perturbation engine [11] 
is developed. On one hand, the message perturbation engine 
can effectively implement location K-anonymity. On the 
other hand, the QoS requirements can be met. But only a part 
of users can get the ideal levels of privacy as they require. 
Some of the users' requests cannot be delivered to the LBS 
providers permanently because they may be missed in the 
spatial cloaking algorithm. Neighbor-k and local-k methods 
are used to establish the cloaking region, which can only 
achieve the local optimal resolution without getting the 
global resolution. The spatial and temporal resolution is 
realized at the expense of denying several users’ requests. 
In this paper, clustering algorithms are used to tackle 
such drawbacks of the cloaking algorithm mentioned in [11]. 
Our proposed system consists of a trusted third party (TTP) 
acting as a middle layer between mobile users and LBS 
providers. First, TTP receives the exact location information 
from a mobile user. Then, TTP will blur the exact 
information into a cloaked spatial area using clustering 
algorithms. Next, a list of results will be sent to TTP because 
the LBS provider cannot receive the exact location 
information but the cloaked area. Finally, TTP will select the 
most optimal result to the mobile user from the list. 
Therefore, a mobile user can enjoy LBSs and get more 
privacy without revealing his private location information. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, 
we describe the system architecture. Section 3 presents the 
clustering algorithms in detail. The system theoretical 
analysis is given in section 4. Section 5 shows experiment 
results. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 6. 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
In this section, we describe the architecture of our 
location privacy protection system in Fig.1. Mobile users 
communicate with LBS providers through TTP. TTP acts as 
an anonymity server between mobile users and LBS 
providers. Cluster algorithms are running in TTP, and TTP 
helps to achieve location K-anonymity according to the 
required anonymity level of each mobile user.  
Supposing that the channel between every mobile user 
and TTP is secure, the exact location information from a 
mobile user to TTP can be protected from being obtained by 
attackers. TTP blurs the decrypted exact location information 
into a cloaked spatial area with clustering algorithms. The 
cloaked area composed of K users is sent to the LBS 
provider. Due to lack of the mobile user’s exact location 
information, the LBS provider may send back a list of results 
to TTP. Lastly, TTP will select the most optimal result to the 
mobile user based on his exact location information. The 
value of K can vary with the anonymity level of each mobile 
user. The following six steps in Fig. 1 describe the whole 
process. 
(1) Every mobile user sends a message consisting of his 
exact location, K, and a LBS request.  
(2) All users are clustered as soon as TTP receives the 
message. 
(3) The exact location information is replaced by MBR of 
the cluster where the mobile user locates. 
(4) LBS returns a list of results to TTP in light of the 
received MBR from step 3. 
(5) TTP sends the optimal result to the mobile user based 
on the exact location information in step 1. 
(6) The mobile user receives the result from step 5. 
Since a mobile device possesses limited memory and 
limited computing capabilities, it cannot act as an anonymity 
server instead of TTP.  
 
Figure 1.  System Architecture 
III. CLUSTERING ALGORITHMS 
In this work we propose a location privacy protection 
scheme called ClusterCloak for the above described 
pervasive computing environment. ClusterCloak is run by 
TTP to blur a user’s exact information. When a mobile user 
requests LBS, he will send a user profile to TTP. A user 
profile is a message defined as follows: 
:{ , , ( , ), , }s id idm S u n x y K Ct∈ . The payload content in ms is 
omitted. The notions are listed in Table I.  
As soon as receiving ms, TTP divides the whole area into 
several clusters. The exact location information in ms is 
replaced by MBR of the user’s cluster so as to achieve K-
anonymity. Consequently TTP sends a message mt to LBS. 
Let [ ]( , ) ,t s t s t sφ = − + , which extends a numerical value t 
to a range by amount s. mt is defined as follows.  
1 1:{ , , : ( , ),  : ( , ), }
2 2t id id MBR MBR
m T u n X cx W Y cy H C tφ φ∈  
The ClusterCloak has the following features: 
1) K-anonymity: K in ms means the anonymity level the 
user desires, which must be met by TTP. 
2) High quality QoS: There is a balance point between 
QoS and K in the past approach [11]. High quality QoS 
requires the diminution of the cloaked area, which may 
increase the chance of being found by attackers. Conversely, 
the extension of the cloaked area may influence the accuracy 
of the query results and make the user not attain the optimal 
result. In our paper, ClusterCloak can solve the above 
contradictoriness. Adjacent users can be divided into the 
same cluster; hence the cloaked area may dwindle as far as 
possible on the premise of meeting the required K-
anonymity level. 
3) High efficiency: The mobile user’s query must be 
responded by the LBS provider in real time. Even if users 
move, TTP must finish clusters adjustment quickly. 
4) Robustness: In some cases, though users move, 
clusters do not need adjusting, which reduces the workload 
of TTP. 
The recursive cluster algorithms will be introduced in 
detail in the following. 
TABLE I.  LIST OF NOTATIONS 
Notation Description 
S A message set the source sends 
T A message set TTP sends 
ms A message in set S 
mt A message in set T 
uid User ID 
nid Message ID 
K Anonymity level 
cx, cy Coordinate  of center of every cluster 
x,y Coordinate of a user 
X,Y Coordinate range of MBR 
HMBR Height of MBR 
WMBR Width of MBR 
Ct Content of message 
ci The i-th cluster 
 
3.1 Building Clusters  
ClusterCloak is composed of six algorithms. Next we 
will introduce the algorithms in detail. 
3.1.1 Related Definitions 
Definition 1: Cluster Area is a circle whose radius is the 
distance from the center to the remotest point in the cluster.  
Definition 2: Neighbor Clusters are two tangent clusters 
or two intersecting clusters.  
Definition 3: Pneed is the probability of rebuilding a 
cluster when a mobile user moves. 
Definition 4: Nex is the number of extra nodes, without 
which the cluster can still keep robust. 
Cluster Area and Neighbor Clusters are used in the 
process of cluster merging. Pneed and Nex are utilized to judge 
if a cluster needs dividing.  
3.1.2 The Choice of Initial Center  
The choice of initial center has strong relations with the 
complexity of building clusters. In this paper, the following 
four methods are adopted.  
MN: Two nearest points along the vertical direction or 
the horizontal direction in the MBR are selected. 
NR: One point is selected randomly, and the other is the 
nearest one to this point. 
RP: Two points are selected randomly.  
RS: All points are divided into two sets in the horizontal 
way, and a random point is selected as the center of every set. 
3.1.3 Building Clusters 
After selecting the cluster center, each point is assigned 
to the nearest cluster according to the distance from it to the 
center. Then new center will be calculated and each point is 
assigned to the nearest cluster again. The above process will 
repeat until the sum distance between every point and cluster 
center (CDS) converges to a certain range. The new center 
and CDS are defined as follows: 
∑
∈
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We use .ic CDS to stand for the CDS of i-th cluster. 
The process of building clusters is illustrated in 
Algorithm 1 which applies a bipartite cluster method. The 
initial phase is in lines 2-4. Cm is defined as a structure 
which records the cluster identifier (ID), the nodes ID, the 
cluster center, the cluster size, CDS, MBR, Pneed, Nex, and a 
variable divided. The local variable divided represents if the 
cluster needs dividing. Its value is true or false, which 
depends on the value of Pneed and Nex. When Pneed is equal to 
zero and Nex is more than one, divided is true. Otherwise, 
divided is false meaning the cluster needs converting. 
Cm changes as a new cluster is created or an old cluster 
is merged. Initially, Cm only contains the initial cluster c0, so 
Algorithm 2 is called recursively in lines 5-11.  
In Algorithm 2, if an old cluster cj can be divided into 
two new clusters ca and cb, then cj is deleted and ca and cb 
are inserted into Cm. The phase of partitioning a cluster is in 
lines 3-15. When a user leaves the old cluster and joins 
another one, both centers will be adjusted.  
 
Algorithm 1 Building clusters 
1 Function BuildingCluster 
2 // Initially, the whole area is seen as a big cluster c0.  
3 0.c CDS = ∞ .//Initialize the CDS of c0 
4 Insert c0 into Cm. 
5 While (true) 
6 If falsedivided.c,Cmc ji ≠∃∈∀  Then 
7             If cj.divided = true  Then 
8                 Generate two initial center points: va, vb. 
9 BinaryCluster(cj,va,vb) 
10 Else break 
11 End 
 
 
Algorithm 2 Cluster division 
1 Function  BinaryCluster(cj,va,vb) 
2 //Two new clusters ca and cb are initialized 
3 Repeat 
4 For each pi∈cj 
5 If distance(pi,va)>distance(pi,vb) Then 
6              pi .clusterID =  va .clusterID  
7              ca.add( pi ) 
8         Else  pi .clusterID = vb.dlusterID  
9              cb.add( pi ) 
10 End 
11 Re-calculate center of ca, cb 
12 If . 1  . 1need needca P cb P= − ∨ = − Then  
13 cj.divided = -1 
14 Return FALSE  // cj cannot be divided. 
15 Until the center of ca and cb do not change. 
16 Insert ca, cb into Cm.  
17 Delete  cj. 
18 Return TRUE 
3.2 Adjusting Clusters  
In pervasive computing environments, a mobile user is 
roaming from one domain to another domain, so clusters 
may be adjusted. Firstly, a cluster does not need adjusting if 
a user roams in his original cluster. Secondly, a user will be 
assigned to the nearest cluster if he leaves his home cluster. 
If his home cluster cannot meet the K-anonymity level, it 
should be merged with its nearest cluster.  
3.2.1 A User’s Joining  
We denote k1, k2, …, km as anonymity levels of m users, 
where k1, k2, …, km are arranged in the ascending order. 
When one or multi-users join a new cluster, Algorithm 3 will 
be implemented to divide the cluster into two clusters. But if 
either cluster cannot meet the requirement of K-anonymity, 
cluster adjustment is not successful. Only Pneed and Nex are 
re-calculated and users can obtain higher privacy levels 
because the cluster size is larger than km. Algorithm 4 is 
proposed to adjust the cluster whenever the size of the cluster 
has changed. 
Algorithm 3  A user’s  partition  
1 Function  PointInsertion(p) 
2 Find the nearest cluster ci . 
3 ci .add(p). 
4 Update ci in Cm. 
5 If  0 . 1i needc P< ≤  Then 
6 . 1, . 1i need i exc P c N= = . 
7 Else . . 1i ex i exc N c N= + . 
8 ClusterAdjustment( ci ). 
 
Algorithm 4  A cluster’s adjusting  
1 Function  ClusterAdjustment(ci) 
2 ci .divided = true. 
3 Adjust the CDS of ci. 
4 Same as lines 4-10 in Algorithm 1 to 
iteratively divide ci. 
3.2.2 A User’s Leaving 
When a user leaves the home cluster, four scenarios may 
occur. Algorithm 5 illustrates the adjustment of cluster when 
a user leaves.  
Firstly, if m is bigger than km, the cluster can still keep 
robust. When one user leaves, it holds that m – 1 ≥ km, which 
means the anonymity levels of the rest users can still be met. 
Therefore, Pneed and Nex are re-calculated and the cluster does 
not need rebuilding.  
Secondly, if the equations of m = km and km > km-1 are true, 
a user whose anonymity level is km leaves the cluster. The 
cluster size will become m-1, and k1 ≤ k2 ≤ …≤ km-1 ≤ m-1 is 
true. The anonymity levels of the rest users can still be met. 
Therefore the cluster does not need rebuilding. 
Thirdly, if the equation of m = km is true, a user whose 
anonymity level is ki leaves (ki ≠ km). Therefore, the cluster 
size will become m-1. km is bigger than m-1. Therefore the 
cluster needs merging and Algorithm 6 is called. 
  It can be drawn from the second and third scenarios that 
-1
need
mP
m
= . 
Last, if the equations of m = km and km = km-1 are true, any 
user in the cluster leaves. The cluster size becomes m-1. The 
anonymity level of km or km-1 cannot be met. Algorithm 6 will 
be implemented to rebuild clusters and hence Pneed = 1. 
Algorithm 5 A user’s leaving  
1 Function PointQuit(p) 
2 Find the cluster ci in which p resides.  
3 If  ci . Nex > 1 Then  
4 ci .del(p). 
5 ClusterAdjustment( ci ). 
6 Else If  ci . Nex = 1 Then 
7 ci . Nex = 0. 
8 Adjust ci . Pneed = 1.  
9 Else ClusterMerge(ci). 
10 Update Cm. 
3.2.3 Clusters Merging 
When K-anonymity cannot be met because of a user’s 
leaving, the cluster should be merged with a neighbor that 
owns the minimum MBR. Algorithm 6 will be implemented. 
Algorithm 6 Clusters mergence and division  
1 Function ClusterMerge(ci) 
2 Record the Neighbor Clusters of ci with the 
largest Nex in MCm . 
3 If 1MCm ≥  Then // Size of MCm is bigger 
than 1 
4 Select the cluster cj with minimum MBR. 
5 Foreach s ip c∈  
6 cj.add(ps). 
7 End 
8 Delete ci 
9 ClusterAdjustment( cj ). 
In line 2 of Algorithm 6, TTP searches the neighbor 
cluster of ci with the minimum MBR. Users in ci will be 
added into the neighbor cluster cj, and then ci is deleted from 
Cm. At last, Algorithm 4 is called to divide cj into smaller 
ones. 
IV. SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
In this section, ClusterCloak will be analyzed 
theoretically in terms of privacy and performance. 
4.1 Privacy Analysis 
ClusterCloak aims to protect location privacy with 
personalized K-anonymity. K-anonymity represents that the 
attacked probability of each user is 1/K in a region of K users. 
For any cluster, C  is defined as the number of users in the 
cluster and km is defined as the maximum K-anonymity level.  
In our ClusterCloak, each cluster is built based on  mC k≥  
which indicates that any person can get more privacy than he 
expects. /kR C k= is defined as the relative K-anonymity.  
Therefore, the bigger Rk is, the more privacy TTP can 
provide.  In Fig. 2, Rk is illustrated. MN can provide the 
highest Rk, but it cannot provide a constant Rk. MN shows an 
ascending trend during the interval [100-400] and tends to 
balance at last. However, NR, RP and RS remain a constant 
Rk during the whole process. In summary, all methods can 
guarantee Rk > 1 so as to provide higher anonymity levels 
than users expect. 
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Figure 2.  Relative K-anonymity 
To further prove that ClusterCloak can provide higher 
privacy level, entropy analysis will be discussed. 
Entropy is a concept of information maintaining great 
importance in physics, chemistry, and information theory. In 
essence, the most general interpretation of entropy is as a 
measure of our uncertainty about a system. Greater entropy 
means more uncertainty. 
Let pi denote the probability that the i-th user may be 
regarded as a target user T by attackers. The entropy of all 
users is 2
1
log
C
i i
i
H p p p
=
= −∑( ) . Since it can be obtained 
that mC k≥ , 1 2 1 1...... m
m
p p p
C k
= = = = ≤ and we can 
hold that 2 2( ) log log mH p C k= ≥ . In Fig. 3, it also can be 
seen that the entropy of each method is higher, which 
indicates that ClusterCloak can provide more uncertainty so 
as to reduce the chance of being identified by attackers. 
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Figure 3.  Entropy Analysis 
4.2 Complexity Analysis of Building Original Clusters  
In order to achieve location K-anonymity, a cloaked area 
instead of a user’s exact location information is sent to LBS 
providers by TTP. ARNN [13] forms a pyramid structure to 
search k nearest neighbors to form the cloaked area. Nbr-k 
and local-k [12] are proposed to make TTP act as a message 
perturbation engine to form the MBR for the users. 
HilbertCloak [8] utilizes a Hilbert space filling chain to 
define a total order among users’ locations. By using the 
curve, HilbertCloak calculates the area to replace the exact 
location of the users. A Casper [10] proposes a grid structure, 
and performs a bottom up way to search for the cloaked area. 
All the above methods can only get local optimal solution, 
while ClusterCloak can get global optimal solution. 
For a cluster containing n users, the complexity of one 
clustering procedure in ClusterCloak method is O(nt), which 
can be simplified to O(n), since the number of iterations, i.e. 
t, is constant. In the worst case, the complexity of the 
recursion process is ( ) 2 ( 2) ( )T n T n O n= + . Since O(n) is 
the complexity of each procedure, there must exist a constant 
a satisfying ( ) 2 ( 2)T n T n an≤ + . A full binary tree of 
complexity can be formed in Fig. 4. The tree height is lgn-1. 
The total complexity is O(n×lgn). 
cn
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Figure 4.  Iteration Tree 
As shown in Table II, the complexity of ClusterCloak is 
O(n×lgn), which is lower than that of Nbr-k, Local-k and 
ARNN. 
TABLE II.  COMPLEXITY OF BUILDING CLUSTERS 
Algorithm Complexity 
Nbr-k [12] O(n2) 
Local-k [12] O(n2) 
ARNN [13] O(n2) 
ClusterCloak O(n×lgn) 
Casper [10] O(n×lgn) 
HilbertCloak [8] O(n×lgn) 
 
4.3 Complexity Analysis of Adjusting Clusters  
When a user joins or leaves a cluster, the clusters 
adjustment will be performed. Different from other methods 
in [8][10][12][13], ClusterCloak can get global optimal 
solution instead of locally optimal solution. Moreover, the 
newly cloaked area is adjusted locally when a user moves. 
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Figure 5.  Average Cluster Size 
As discussed in Section 4.2, the complexity of one cluster 
constitution is O(n), which directly depends on the cluster 
size. Fig.5 illustrates the relationship between the cluster size 
and the total number of users. It indicates that the cluster size 
is almost stable.  MN is higher than the other methods, but 
still less than 2km. Therefore, the cluster size can be regarded 
as a constant.  
When a user joins, the cluster size is C +1. Once a 
member leaves, the cluster size is C -1. If two clusters 
merge, the maximum size is 2 C -1 at most. From the above 
analysis, the complexity of adjusting a cluster is O(1), which 
reduces the computation cost greatly. The comparison with 
other algorithms is listed in Table III, which shows that our 
ClusterCloak has the lowest complexity. 
TABLE III.  COMPLEXITY OF ADJUSTING CLUSTERS 
Algorithm Complexity 
Nbr-k [12] O(n2) 
Local-k [12] O(n2) 
ARNN [13] O(n2) 
ClusterCloak O(1) 
Casper [10] O(lgn) 
HilbertCloak [8] O(lgn) 
 
To maintain K-anonymity, Nbr-k, Local-k, and ARNN 
re-compute a cloaked area when a user leaves or joins a 
cluster. Casper maintains a quadtree. HilbertCloak maintains 
a Hilbert chain. Nbr-k, Local-k, and ARNN re-establish the 
system structure again. In Casper and HilbertCloak, they re-
establish the structure, but the cost is up to O(lgn). Compared 
with ClusterCloak, the complexity of other algorithms is 
relatively high. 
4.4 Complexity of Initial Center 
In this section, we will mainly analyze the complexity of 
choosing the initial center, which is a critical issue for 
building clusters.  In MN method, at most n points locating 
in the MBR are traversed in order to generate the two nearest 
points, so the complexity is O(n). In NR method, a random 
point is generated at the cost of O(1). The nearest node 
around the center must be scanned, so n points are compared 
in the worst case. The complexity is O(n). Two random 
points are selected in RP method, so its complexity is O(1). 
In RS method, horizontal dimensions of the users are sorted 
in an ascending order. Then, the whole region is divided into 
two equal parts and a random point is selected in every part.  
If the quick sort is called, the whole complexity is O(nlgn). 
The complexity of each method is illustrated in Table IV. It 
can be seen that none complexity is higher than O(nlgn). 
TABLE IV.  COMPLEXITY OF CHOOSING INITIAL CENTER 
Method Complexity 
MN O(n) 
NR O(n) 
RP O(1) 
RS O(nlgn) 
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Experiment Setup 
We use the VANET (Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network) [14] 
System that simulates movement of cars and generates 
requests using the position information. Random Map 
Generator has been performed to create the geographical 
distribution of the map (Fig.6) and the trace of the vehicles 
(Fig.7) respectively. 
 
Figure 6.  Geographical 
Distribution 
Figure 7.  Visualization of Vehicle 
Trace 
The number of mobile users is selected from the list {100, 
200, 400, 600, 800, 1000}. The K-anonymity level is from 2 
to 5. For every combination of the different number and K, 
10 data sets recording users' location information are used. 
Accordingly the sum of sets is 6×4×10. In order to verify the 
universality of ClusterCloak, experiments are made when K 
is randomly selected from 2 to 5.  The sum of sets is 6×1×10. 
5.2 Time Consumption 
In this section, time consumption of building original 
clusters and adjusting clusters is analyzed. 
5.2.1 Building the Original Clusters 
In Fig.8, the relationship between the time consumption 
of building the initial clusters and the number of random 
users is depicted. ClusterCloak can finish building clusters in 
3s, which is much lower than 5s in [12]. Fig.8 also indicates 
that different methods such as MN, NR, RP and RS nearly 
take the same time to establish clusters, which is in 
accordance with our conclusion in Section 4.4. 
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Figure 8.  Time Consumption of Building Clusters 
5.2.2 Users Joining  
In Fig.9, the relationship between the time consumption 
of adjusting clusters and the percentage of joining users is 
depicted. In our experiments, the percentages are 5%, 10%, 
15%, and 20% respectively. It can be seen that MN is the 
fastest and MR is the lowest. The lowest time is 0.15s, which 
explains ClusterCloak can finish adjusting in no more than 
0.15s.  
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Figure 9.  Time Consumption of Users Joining 
5.2.3 Users Leaving 
In Fig.10, the relationship between the time consumption 
of adjusting and the percentage of leaving users is depicted. 
In our experiments, the percentages are 5%, 10%, 15%, and 
20% respectively. It can be seen that the time cost of four 
methods is almost the same, and the maximum is less than 
0.03s. So we can summarize that ClusterCloak can finish 
adjusting in less than 0.03s. 
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Figure 10.  Time Consumption of Users Leaving 
5.3 Characteristic Analysis of Clusters 
5.3.1 Cluster Stability 
In Fig.11, the relationship between the number of clusters 
and the number of users is depicted. The number of clusters 
is linear with the number of users. Though the number of 
clusters in these methods is different, the slope of each 
method is constant, which indicates the size of the cluster is 
nearly a constant. Hence we can draw the conclusion that the 
size of clusters does not change with the increment of the 
number of users, which shows that ClusterCloak can build 
clusters stably. 
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Figure 11.  Cluster Stability 
5.3.2 Cluster Robustness 
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Figure 12.  Cluster Robustness 
This section mainly focuses on the relationship between 
the number of clusters adjusted and the percentage of leaving 
users. The less the number is, the more robust the clusters 
can provide. Fig.12 shows that the number of clusters 
adjusted is much smaller compared with the number of 
leaving users. Therefore, we can conclude that our 
ClusterCloak can provide more robustness. 
5.4 QoS Analysis 
In this section, the relationship between /s cR S S=  and 
the number of users is analyzed. Sc is defined as the area of a 
cluster C. S is defined as the total area of all clusters. The 
relation between Rs and the cluster size is approximately 
linear.  If TTP sends a smaller region to the LBS, a smaller 
list of results will be returned. Fig.13 shows Rs is much lower 
than 1 in all the methods. Though the MBR area is small, K-
anonymity can still be guaranteed. Therefore, ClusterCloak 
can provide accurate QoS. 
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Figure 13.  QoS Analysis 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have proposed a location privacy 
preserving scheme for pervasive computing environment 
named ClusterCloak. Our approach can effectively protect 
location privacy with personalized K-anonymity while 
satisfying the privacy and QoS requirements of the users. 
ClusterCloak is adopted by TTP, and clusters can be adjusted 
in real time when users move from one domain to another 
domain. The theoretical and experimental analysis proves 
that our approach can provide more privacy, more accurate 
QoS, more robustness and lower complexity, which balances 
the security and the requirements of the pervasive computing 
devices.  
Our future work will include: 
• Heuristic methods: The methods of selecting initial 
points may affect the accuracy of ClusterCloak. 
Therefore, we will study the heuristic methods for 
ClusterCloak to achieve higher privacy level. 
• MAC address privacy: ClusterCloak can only 
achieve location privacy for users in the application 
layer. Next, we will protect location privacy for 
MAC address. 
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